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In chapter 1 in this volume, Daniel M. G. Raff and Peter Temin point out that, 
contrary to the assumptions of much economic theory of prior decades, “in- 
formation is costly and hard to find.” That fact has significant implications for 
how  information is used  in decision making within firms. The period from 
1850 to 1920 was one of  firm growth and evolution. During it, many Ameri- 
can firms first recognized the value of and invested in systematic internal in- 
formation; of  necessity, they  also came to recognize its costs.’ This paper 
focuses on the interaction over time of  supply and demand factors affecting 
investment in and use of internal information. 
Section 4.1 briefly explores the growing demand for internal information 
during this period.  Section 4.2 looks at supply factors affecting the use of 
internal information. It describes the growth of information technologies, in- 
cluding mechanical and bureaucratic devices and systems, that were adopted 
to lower the costs of handling internal information. By lowering the cost of 
collecting, transmitting, analyzing, storing, retrieving, and disseminating in- 
ternal information to those making and implementing decisions, these tech- 
nologies made it economic for firms to acquire and use more information. 
The longest section (4.3) shows how these supply and demand factors inter- 
acted over time in  a single company, the Scovill Manufacturing Company. 
This case study reveals that changes in the availability and flows of informa- 
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tion occurred unevenly, affected by factors such as managerial needs, financial 
and human investments in the existing system, and costs of changing the sys- 
tem.  Section 4.4 draws some conclusions from this case study and suggests 
some parallels for contemporary firms. 
4.1  Information Demand: Growth, Structural Evolution, and 
Systematic Management 
In the small, single-function American firms that predominated before the 
mid-nineteenth  century, market prices and availability were the main sources 
of  information  used  in  decision  making  by  owner/managers  (Johnson  and 
Kaplan  1987; Chandler  1977). Account  books and  correspondence  docu- 
mented external,  market transactions; virtually  no information was recorded 
or collected about internal operations, which were managed by the direct oral 
supervision of the owner/manager(s). 
The early nineteenth-century  textile factories deviated from this norm. In 
these factories, where multiple functions were combined in the same facility 
and where ownership was separated from management,  factory owners cre- 
ated the first, relatively primitive cost accounting systems. These information 
systems, according to Johnson and Kaplan (1987), allowed owners to monitor 
the costs and  profits  of  their  operations to assure that  internal,  managerial 
coordination  of  multiple  functions  was as efficient as that provided  by  the 
market when the functions were separate. 
In subsequent decades, the railroads and the telegraph companies appeared, 
expanding markets for other goods while growing themselves. As these firms 
grew, expanded  their geographical  range, and  lengthened  their  hierarchies, 
their  managers  faced and gradually responded to new demands for internal 
information. In the 184Os, the need to assure safety and honesty in dispersed 
firms led to initial innovations in internal information gathering and dissemi- 
nation in railroads (e.g., Salsbury  1967). Regular, if  still relatively  limited, 
flows  of  information  up the  hierarchy  documented  monetary  transactions. 
Written rule books  and instructions  documented  rules and regulations con- 
cerning railroad operations and disseminated them down the hierarchy. Begin- 
ning in the 1850s, many growing railroads encountered crises of profitability 
when growth led to diseconomies of scale and the competitive environment 
prevented passing costs directly on to customers (Chandler 1977). Major east- 
ern railroads such as the New  York  and Erie Railroad and the Pennsylvania 
Railroad instituted extensive systems of data collection and analysis-involv- 
ing major innovations in financial, cost, and capital accounting-during  the 
1850s and subsequent decades. They developed  a system of records and re- 
ports  to draw  information  up the  hierarchy  for monitoring,  assessing,  and 
comparing performance within and among their divisions. 
Growth alone was not necessarily  enough to create a demand for extensive 
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Railroad, for example, grew quite large (at one point it was the longest rail- 
road in the country), but it had less competition than many eastern lines, and 
its profits were bolstered by  supplementary revenues from the sale of land 
granted to it by Congress. It was buffered from the most serious consequences 
of operating inefficiencies and dominated by managers who believed that per- 
sonal leadership and exhortation, rather than systematic collection and moni- 
toring of information, would elicit efficient operations. Thus its management 
made only the minimal investments in its internal information system neces- 
sary to guarantee safety and honesty and to prevent cash flow crises. Only in 
1887 did its new president Stuyvesant Fish, a financier who believed in mon- 
itoring financial and operating data in much greater detail, begin to overcome 
internal resistance to change, aided by  new reporting requirements imposed 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission and decreased profitability resulting 
from increased competition (Yates 1989, chaps. 4  and 5). 
In the mid-  and late nineteenth century many manufacturing firms adopted 
new production technologies, expanded to serve the larger markets created by 
the railroads and telegraph, and took on multiple functions. At this point, they 
encountered their own crises of  profitability. Confronted by  the inefficiency 
and chaos that resulted from growth and vertical integration without changes 
in  managerial methods, they began to grapple with  methods of  improving 
efficiency. Their managers began to demand systematic internal information 
for use in achieving efficient coordination. In developing internal information 
systems, manufacturing firms did not, for the most part, depend on the ad- 
vances already made by the railroads; faced with similar problems, they redis- 
covered many of the same principles. 
Their  search for more  efficient operating procedures was  shaped by  an 
emerging ideology. The systematic management philosophy emerged in the 
fledgling management literature during the final decades of  the nineteenth 
century.2  Writers in this tradition noted the breakdown in horizontal and verti- 
cal coordination that resulted from expansion of the hierarchy in both direc- 
tions. To  improve efficiency, they advocated systematizing (that is, standard- 
izing) and documenting all operations from the shop floor to the managerial 
office, and establishing flows of  written information up and down the hier- 
archy to coordinate them. Operating policies and results were documented to 
reduce dependence on the specific individual, whether worker or manager, 
and to create an organizational memory. Information was systematically re- 
corded and drawn up the hierarchy from the shop floor to higher levels of 
2. Discussions of this movement may  be found in Litterer (1961a, 1961b, 1963) and Jelinek 
(1980). The broad but amorphous systematic management movement should not be confused with 
the more narrowly focused scientific management movement, which emerged around the turn of 
the century as one element of that broader movement. While Frederick Taylor and his followers 
focused on improving efficiency on the  shop floor, the broader movement was concerned with 
systematizing operations at all levels from the top to the bottom of the firm. For discussion of the 
relationship of these two movements, see Nelson (1974). 120  JoAnne Yates 
management. At each level, the information was analyzed and used in moni- 
toring and evaluating lower levels as well as in making decisions about oper- 
ations. The downward flow was made up of  written orders, instructions, and 
policies-the  results of decisions based on the upward flows-communicated 
down the hierarchy to those implementing policy. 
In the period from 1880 to  1920, growing manufacturing firms gradually 
adopted many of the uses of internal information advocated by systematizers, 
as proponents of the philosophy were often called. They came to depend on 
extensive vertical flows of written information to coordinate operations. This 
philosophy, then, spurred demand for internal information in firms. 
Growth and increased organizational complexity alone did not account for 
the large increase in demand for such flows of information. Growth and com- 
plexity created a demand for better coordination, but not necessarily for this 
method of  coordination. For example, Masahiko Aoki has recently pointed 
out that methods of coordination less dependent on vertical flows of written 
information were adopted in Japanese firms (Aoki 1990). In those firms, hor- 
izontal and often oral coordination and exchange of  information played a 
much more important role than in American firms (though not displacing all 
vertical coordination). Aoki argues that economic efficiency alone does not 
account for the differences between western and Japanese patterns of  coordi- 
nation, and that historical and cultural factors may have shaped the patterns. 
One such factor was the emergence of the ideology of systematic management 
in  American firms during the decades surrounding the turn of  the twentieth 
century. This philosophy, which saw no benefit in building consensus, would 
have been less congenial to Japanese social norms and traditions. 
4.2  Information Supply: Changes in Information Technology 
This increased demand for internal information might have been curtailed 
by  its high cost, except for some changes on the supply side of the equation. 
Changes in information technology adopted by American firms between 1840 
and 1920 reduced the cost of using internal information. During that period a 
variety of technologies were adopted for collecting, transmitting, storing, re- 
trieving, analyzing, and disseminating the increasing amount of  information 
being collected. Some of  these improvements were mechanical or electrical 
devices that fit a traditional definition of technology (e.g., typewriter, adding 
machine, telegraph), while others were bureaucratic techniques with only lim- 
ited links to physical devices (e.g., forms, indexing systems, graphic repre- 
sentations). They were adopted in an  attempt to control the rising costs of 
handling the increasing amounts of information being collected. Supplement- 
ing this cost-control motive was an added element of ideology-in  this case, 
it might be called fad-driving  ad~ption.~  These technologies came to be seen 
3. I am indebted to Naomi Lamoreaux for bringing to my attention the possibility of an ideolog- 
ical component on the supply, as well as the demand, side of the information equation. 121  Investing in Information 
as visible symbols of the modem management techniques fostered by the sys- 
tematic management philosophy. Whatever the specific motive for adoption, 
these technologies generally influenced the economic trade-offs concerning 
the use of information, reducing costs and thus increasing the supply of inter- 
nal information available at a given cost. 
4.2.1  Recording and Compiling Information 
The actual recording and compiling of  operating information occupied in- 
creasing amounts of  managerial and clerical time as demand for such infor- 
mation increased. Soon the costs of  the task became an obvious target for 
reduction. Both mechanical devices (the typewriter) and clerical techniques 
(preprinted forms) were adopted to reduce the time and thus cost of recording 
and transcribing information. 
The typewriter lowered the costs of all written documentation, whether re- 
cording or disseminating information. Handwriting was a slow and thus ex- 
pensive method of  producing documents.  Over the previous two centuries 
there had been many attempts to mechanize the production of documents, but 
until the last quarter of  the nineteenth century none was commercially suc- 
cessful because none was able to reduce the speed of this activity below that 
of  handwriting  (Bliven  1954;  Current  1954). The  first  successful  mass- 
produced  typewriters emerged from the Remington Factory in  1874. They 
were not initially aimed toward the general business market, but toward court 
reporters, authors, and other specialized niche users. But even before touch 
typing was developed, typewriters operated by experienced typists could pro- 
duce around seventy-five words per minute, in comparison to about twenty- 
five words per minute for pen and paper, a fact that quickly attracted business. 
The typewriter was also instrumental in lowering costs in other ways. Be- 
fore the typewriter, documents were sometimes produced  in final form by 
clerks and sometimes by higher-paid managers or even owners. Because touch 
typing was  a specialized skill that required training,  its introduction made 
more strict the allocation of document production to lower-priced clerical la- 
bor. That clerical labor became increasingly female in the 1890s and the early 
twentieth century, further lowering its cost. Female clerks were paid, on av- 
erage, less than male clerks, and the mechanization and feminization of the 
occupation lowered the wage for all clerks in comparison to wages of manu- 
facturing workers (Weiss 1978; Rotella 1981; Davies 1982; Goidin 1990). 
In the 1880s and 1890s growing firms adopted the typewriter just in time to 
decrease the rising costs of their increased written communication (both inter- 
nal  and external). In some cases the adoption of  the typewriter was either 
accelerated or slowed by the status the device quickly acquired as a symbol of 
modem business methods. At Du Pont, for example, the older, more conserv- 
ative generation was initially reluctant to adopt it, and had to be convinced of 
its effects on costs before investing in it. The younger, more progressive du 
Ponts, on the other hand,  adopted such modem devices immediately, even 
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point where such devices were essential (Yates 1989, 210-19).  Whatever the 
motivation, typewriters clearly reduced the costs of all types of written docu- 
mentation. 
Another technology, this time clerical rather than mechanical, specifically 
reduced the time and thus cost of  recording and compiling standardized data 
on a routine basis: forms. In the early nineteenth century, information about 
financial transactions was recorded in ruled, double entry accounting books. 
Most other documents were written out in full on blank paper. As  routine 
reporting  or  operating  information  began  to  increase  around  midcentury, 
daily, weekly, and monthly reports proliferated. Since the typewriter had not 
yet entered the picture, both the explanations and the figures had to be labori- 
ously written out by hand for each report. Moreover, the person writing such 
reports could easily omit or alter some category of information, lessening the 
value of  the record for comparative analysis. And because the figures were 
typically embedded in text, anyone attempting to compile sets of information 
at higher levels had to search for the key figures. 
Printed forms (later, often typed and duplicated) with spaces for entering 
specific information were adopted in the latter part of the nineteenth century 
to make “clerical work easier than would be possible if  the blank sheet of 
paper  were  used,”  as  one  systematizer later explained  (Leffingwell  1927, 
470). These standard forms provided all of the information that did not vary 
from one reporting period to the next, leaving room for the varying informa- 
tion to be filled in (by hand or with a typewriter) for each report. They both 
reduced the time spent in recording information and encouraged consistency 
and “system” in the data recorded. Moreover, because the same information 
was always in the same place on forms, they made it easier to extract the data 
for compilation and analysis at higher levels. 
Tables further simplified extraction of data. Frequently the reports started 
out with figures embedded within text. Sometimes before reports were turned 
into  preprinted  forms  and  sometimes  after,  tabular  formats  were  often 
adopted, reducing the amount of  text and thus facilitating the recording of 
data and its later extraction. Around the turn of the century, the tab function 
was developed for typewriters, further speeding up the recording of  tabular 
data (Leffingwell 1926). 
The managerial publications that emerged at the turn of the century were 
full of articles recommending forms for collecting and compiling data. Many 
of these articles suggested specific sets of forms for specific purposes (e.g., 
“System for Factory Purchases,” 1903). Others gave general guidelines for 
designing forms that would be as efficient as possible for those filling them 
out and those extracting data from them at higher levels for further compila- 
tion  (e.g., Barnum  1925). By  1925, a book on designing forms had  been 
published  (Clarke  1925). For their ability to  promote consistency in  data 
while increasing clerical efficiency, forms came to be seen as almost synony- 
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management movement. Thus they acquired a popularity in their own right, 
perhaps even beyond their efficiency value, as a symbol of modem, systematic 
management methods. 
Together, the typewriter and forms reduced the costs of recording and com- 
piling information, thus allowing firms to record increasing amounts of  it be- 
fore cost became prohibitive. 
4.2.2  Transmitting Information 
The  major  development in  transmitting recorded  information,  the  tele- 
graph, appeared early in the period under discu~sion.~  It increased the supply 
of information by radically increasing the speed of transmission, not by reduc- 
ing the cost of transmitting a certain number of words. The telegraph made it 
possible to use time-sensitive internal information that previously could not 
be transmitted fast enough to be of any value in decision making.5  In addition, 
it facilitated rapid routine flows of  information where speed was worth the 
extra cost. 
Before the telegraph was introduced to the United States in 1844, informa- 
tion could travel only as fast as a person could travel, by boat, stagecoach, or 
other conveyance. While a firm’s manufacturing facilities were usually lo- 
cated in a single area, owners or sales agents might be some distance away. 
Information could be exchanged only as fast as the mails could travel. Thus 
agents in hot competition with rival firms might promise goods by  a certain 
date without knowing whether the order could be delivered on time, or cut 
prices to negotiate sales, making contracts without the direct input of  firm 
management because a delay could lose them the sale. Such interactions were 
a frequent source of  friction between firms and their agents throughout the 
nineteenth century (e.g., Broehl 1984, 187-91;  Yates  1989, 207, 219-21). 
With the telegraph,  information about such negotiations could often be ex- 
changed within the necessary time frame. Thus firms could exert more central 
authority over agents by  insisting that no unauthorized price cuts be taken or 
that rush orders be confirmed with headquarters. 
Firms did not necessarily take full advantage of  the new transmission ca- 
pability offered by  the telegraph. In  1856, after Du  Pont finally installed a 
private telegraph line to connect it to the Wilmington telegraph office several 
miles away, the firm immediately began using it on an ad hoc basis to confirm 
orders and to arrange rapid delivery of powder. It did not, however, use the 
telegraph to rein in its sales agents disbursed around the country. Even near 
4. The telephone, which appeared in the  187Os, facilitated oral communication and coordina- 
tion but did not seem to curb the rapid growth of recorded information. Since my focus here is on 
that recorded information,  I will not discuss the telephone. 
5. The telegraph’s influence on markets has been discussed in DuBoff (1980, 1983) and in Yates 
(1986), and will not be considered here. The telegraph had an interesting influence on the flow of 
internal information in railroads, especially as it was used in railroad dispatching. Since this use 
is so specialized, however, I will omit it from the following discussion. 124  JoAnne Yates 
the end of the century, after the sales function was rearranged and a few prin- 
cipal agents were given salaries and put in charge of commission-based sub- 
agents with contracts requiring them to follow company pricing as communi- 
cated by letters and telegrams, friction continued over price cutting by agents 
in the field.6 Even with the telegraph, Du  Pont was unable or unwilling to 
control its agents. 
At  about the  same time,  however, Repauno Chemical Company, partly 
owned (and later to be wholly absorbed) by Du Pont, was exerting much more 
control over its agents. E. S. Rice, Du Pont’s Chicago agent, belittled Repau- 
no’s Chicago agent by noting that he “is unable to make necessary prices, and 
in fact under his instructions can not meet competition without first commu- 
nicating with  the home office,” a policy that would have been  unworkable 
before the telegraph.’  In fact, however, in the early twentieth century Rice’s 
own methods were to be revealed as inefficient and ineffective, and Repauno’s 
methods, which took full advantage of the additional control offered by  the 
telegraph, were to become the model for all of Du Pont. 
Initially, urgent but ad hoc exchanges of  information such as these about 
the pricing and delivery of particular orders were the principal internal uses of 
the telegraph. Its high per-word cost-in  the 1850s, the first ten words of a 
message between New York and Chicago cost $1.55, while most prepaid let- 
ters cost only $0.03 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975)-made  it unattractive 
for more routine uses. While the price difference did not narrow, by the 1880s 
some growing firms with special needs saw the value of telegraphic commu- 
nication for more routine communication. The integrated meat-packing firms 
that emerged in that decade, Swift and Armour, paid about $200,000 per year 
for telegraphic communication to coordinate the processing and transportation 
of beef via refrigerator cars (Chandler 1977, 396). Without such rapid routine 
communication,  many  cars  of  beef  would  have  spoiled  when  they  were 
stranded between the  midwestern slaughterhouses and  eastern distribution 
points or when they arrived at inappropriate distribution points. Slower modes 
of  communication were virtually worthless in coordinating flows of perish- 
able products, and telegraphic communication was well worth its high cost. 
Moreover, in cases where the telegraph was used heavily for internal commu- 
nication, costs could be reduced by  use of  telegraphic cipher codes, which 
also helped firms maintain secrecy over public telegraph lines. 
The telegraph thus facilitated high-speed internal transmission of informa- 
tion, allowing much closer coordination over distances in cases where owners 
6. See correspondence from E. S.  Rice, Du Pont’s Chicago agent, to  Du Pont headquarters, in 
accession 500,  series 1, part  1, series B, vols. 307-10, Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, 
DE. See Yates (1989, chap. 7) for more details of  Du Pont’s and Repauno’s relations with their 
agents. 
7.  E. S.  Rice to Du Pont headquarters, 30 August 1888, accession 500, series 1, part  1, series 
B, vol. 309. The analysis revealing Rice’s high unit cost is discussed in Chandler and Salsbury 
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or managers recognized that  the value  of  the communication exceeded its 
cost. 
4.2.3  Storing and Retrieving Information 
To be useful in decision making, information had to be stored in such a way 
that it was readily retrievable when it was needed. For comparisons of  one 
period’s operating results to those of previous periods, for example, the latter 
had to be available and accessible. To analyze the profitability of various cus- 
tomer accounts, managers had to have access to correspondence and records 
concerning that  customer’s orders.  Moreover,  if  documentation of  systems 
and policies was to be a useful replacement for reliance solely on individuals, 
that documentation had  to be available for consultation both by  those gov- 
erned by the policy and by  those monitoring and determining policy. As the 
amount of  operating information being gathered and of  policies and proce- 
dures being documented increased around the turn of  the twentieth century, 
accessible storage became increasingly problematic. An  interlocking set of 
devices and clerical systems for vertical filing of  documents emerged at the 
end of the nineteenth century and was widely adopted as a way of increasing 
accessible storage.  Soon after came vertical  files of  structured data cards. 
These innovations in storage technology increased the supply of  information 
available to those making and implementing decisions (Yates 1982). 
In the late nineteenth century, most companies stored documents and cor- 
respondence in a combination of bound volumes, pigeonhole desks or cabi- 
nets, and letter boxes. Both traditional accounts of  external transactions and 
copies of  outgoing correspondence (whether to external parties or to other 
company sites) were recorded in  large bound  volumes. Accounts were re- 
corded directly into the volumes, initially by hand and later using special post- 
ing machines related to typewriters. Internal  and outgoing correspondence 
and other documents freshly written or typed  in  special copying ink were 
“press-copied’’  into bound  volumes. This process involved dampening and 
compressing the original between tissue-paper pages of a large volume (while 
other pages were protected from the dampness by inserted pieces of oil cloth). 
The dampness and pressure on the copying ink transferred a reverse image of 
the document onto the side of the tissue page facing the original. That image 
showed through to the other side of  the thin paper, where it could be  seen 
correctly. This form of copying and storage fixed items in the chronological 
order of creation. 
Incoming correspondence and internal reports,  on the other hand,  were 
folded into packets and annotated on the outside with date, correspondent, 
and sometimes subject, then stored in pigeonholes. Locating a particular item 
in pigeonholes typically required pulling out and unfolding many documents. 
In the late nineteenth century, as the volume of correspondence and internal 
documents increased in growing firms, letter boxes that stored documents flat 
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in a given letter box than in a pigeonhole desk or cabinet, since the documents 
were no longer folded; yet the boxes were usually stored on edge on shelves 
(like bound volumes),  and the user  still had  to pull down, open,  and rifle 
through them to locate a given document. Then papers on top of the desired 
document had to be lifted out in order to remove it. A further development, 
cabinets with drawers of flat files, eliminated the first step but did not improve 
the others. Moreover, incoming and internal documents were separated from 
outgoing correspondence, which was still press-copied into bound volumes. 
Thus someone trying to trace an ongoing exchange of information had to con- 
sult multiple storage devices. 
To  eliminate this problem of bound volumes, copying had to be separated 
from storage. Two methods for copying documents onto loose sheets rather 
than into bound books, both adaptations of existing technology, emerged to- 
wards the end of  the century. The rolling press copier simply press-copied 
documents onto a continuous role of  tissue paper, which was then cut into 
pieces of  appropriate lengths (Wigent, Housel, and Gilman  1916).  Carbon 
paper had been available since quite early in the nineteenth century, but for a 
long time it could only be used with a stylus or pencil, not with the sharp quill 
or steel pens that would tear the paper or be blunted when pressed down hard 
enough to make a carbon copy (Proudfoot 1972). It was immediately clear 
that carbon paper could be used with the typewriter, which entered businesses 
in significant numbers in the 1880s and  1890s. Both rolling copiers and car- 
bon  paper produced  the  loose copies necessary to  free firms from bound 
chronological storage of outgoing correspondence. Carbon paper proved to be 
the cheaper and more convenient method and was clearly more widespread in 
business by  early in the twentieth century, according to a government study 
undertaken  in  1912 (President’s  Commission on  Economy  and  Efficiency 
1912). 
With loose copies of  outgoing documents available, a critical step in the 
evolution of  storage and retrieval systems could occur: the combining of  all 
documents on a single subject, whether outgoing, incoming, or internal, into 
a single storage system accessible by  subject. While this reorganization of 
information could have occurred within the existing box  files, it generally 
awaited the introduction of vertical filing to the business world in 1893 (Chaf- 
fee 1938,4). This method of storage involved both a device and a bureaucratic 
system. As a device, vertical filing consisted of the now-familiar manila fold- 
ers, dividers, and cabinets of  the correct size for storing them in an upright 
position. As a bureaucratic system, vertical filing was introduced as a method 
of combining all documents on a single subject, regardless of origin, into a 
single, centralized storage system and organizing them by  subject or some 
other indexing scheme suitable to the needs of those using them. 
Many  books  and  articles  were  published on filing systems and  various 
methods for organizing and indexing them (e.g., Wigent, Housel, and Gilman 
1916; Hudders 1916). Proponents of  vertical filing noted its advantages over 
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of use-a  folder with all the relevant information on some subject could easily 
be located and lifted out-and  efficiency of space (e.g., Hoskins Office Out- 
fitters 1912; Hudders 1916). They also argued the virtues of various indexing 
and organizing systems, from alphabetical to decimal. 
The shift from a predominantly chronological system that separated docu- 
ments by origin to one that combined all related documents with access based 
on subject or some other functional scheme clearly made information more 
accessible for those making or implementing decisions. In effect, this change 
increased the supply of  internal information. (There is even some evidence 
that the vertical files, which quickly became decentralized in spite of  expert 
recommendations to maintain centralized files, encouraged the generation of 
increased internal documentation. Presumably managers had more incentive 
to document facts and opinions when they knew that the documents would be 
accessible in the future.) In addition to their direct value in lowering the cost 
of retrieving information, filing systems, like forms, came to be seen as sym- 
bols of the modem, systematic methods of management. Thus, symbolic rea- 
sons reinforced efficiency reasons in firms’ decisions to adopt this information 
storage technology. 
A variant of vertical filing, the vertical card file, was soon adopted in many 
firms to create a more compact database of sales or  production statistics, or 
even of a firm’s central accounts (Clark 1916; Morse 1900; Leffingwell 1926, 
1927). Initially, these card files simply used forms (often tabular ones) pre- 
printed  onto stiff cards. Cards were organized by  a single scheme (e.g., a 
customer’s name), and other information could be extracted from each card 
once it was located. Soon devices were added to card files to aid in the rapid 
retrieval of data by  multiple categories. Metal tabs painted different colors 
were clipped to the top or bottom of the cards in designated positions to aid a 
clerk in locating and retrieving all cards with  a particular characteristic. In 
some cases, punched holes or notches were used in conjunction with special 
drawers and rods to extract cards with certain characteristics. As one advocate 
of  such card storage and retrieval systems noted,  “The need for extensive 
cross-indexing which would otherwise be necessary for close and analytical 
utilization of  the data, is by  this method successfully eliminated in nearly 
every case” (Schlink 1918, 136). 
These systems were essentially databases storing structured data that could 
be extracted along multiple dimensions. They greatly increased the supply of 
structured data readily available for analysis, thus presumably increasing its 
use.  For  example,  the extensive tabbed card file maintained  by  Du  Pont’s 
Sales Record Division was used in 1913 to respond to twenty-three thousand 
routine inquiries within  the  headquarters Sales Department,  as  well  as to 
many special requests from the field.a  The data it provided aided in following 
8. This information is based on an  untitled and undated document (ca. 1914) describing and 
justifying the Sales Record Division’s role in the department. It is in the Du Pont records (acces- 
sion 500, group 11,  series 3, file 127) housed in the Hagley Museum and Library. 128  JoAnne Yates 
up on trade and in monitoring sales personnel. Improved storage and access 
made information easier and less expensive to use. 
4.2.4  Analyzing Information 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a variety of adding ma- 
chines, calculating machines, and statistical tabulating machines were intro- 
duced to speed data manipulation and calculations. Some of these were spe- 
cialized bookkeeping machines developed for use in accounting departments 
to post entries and calculate running totals. But as the systematic management 
philosophy encouraged the widespread use of information throughout firms, 
neither extensive calculations nor  the office machines that facilitated them 
were limited to accounting departments any more. 
Tabulating machines were the most powerful technological systems (each 
of  them was actually composed of  several devices) for analyzing data. They 
both sorted data into categories (even more rapidly than card files) and per- 
formed calculations. The electromechanical Hollerith tabulator was initially 
developed to process the data collected for the 1890 U.S. Census. The devices 
making it up were used for various functions: punching holes in the cards to 
record the data in encoded form, sorting the cards by categories, and counting 
and/or calculating as desired. Other tabulating devices, including the mechan- 
ical  Powers  machine,  followed the  Hollerith.  One  systematizer noted  the 
value of such machinery in reducing the time and cost necessary for perform- 
ing large computations: “Wherever the classifying and analyzing of statistics 
or the compiling of reports is part of the daily routine of any business enter- 
prise, there the tabulating machine can be of  invaluable service . . . because 
it will serve more economically and with greater speed and accuracy than a 
large  clerical  force”  (Leffingwell  1926,  176). Calculators  and  tabulators 
helped firms use more information more quickly and less expensively than 
ever before, increasing their effective supply of internal information. As with 
the personal computer today, such machines may also have had a symbolic or 
fad value beyond their contribution to efficiency. 
4.2.5  Disseminating Information 
The increasing amount of information flowing up and down firms created 
two types of  problems in dissemination. The data being recorded, analyzed, 
and passed up the hierarchy created what would now be described as infor- 
mation overload for top decision-makers. Fewer and fewer people were get- 
ting more and more information at the top levels of the hierarchy. Ways of 
presenting information  for  easier  understanding were  needed.  Downward 
flows of information, on the other hand, posed a problem of getting notices of 
policies and procedures to increasing numbers of people at the bottom levels 
of  the hierarchy, preferably in a form that could be consulted in the future. 
Presentational techniques and duplicating methods and devices were adopted 
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Reading and absorbing even the most relevant of the enormous amount of 
available information was increasingly difficult for middle and top manage- 
ment. The tabular forms developed to ease compilation of  data also made 
information somewhat easier for its recipients to use than did prose documents 
with embedded figures. Still, extracting trends and comparisons from tables 
took time and study, and as the amount of  available information increased, 
decision-makers often did not have time to study all of it. Around the turn of 
the century, graphs and charts emerged as an  important managerial tool for 
dealing with this problem. Such techniques may be considered a bureaucratic 
information technology for disseminating information in a form more efficient 
for its recipients to absorb. 
While graphic representations of data had existed for at least a century by 
then, only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did they begin 
to be used to display managerial data (Funkhouser 1937; Yates  1985). Intro- 
duced into firms by  engineers-turned-managers, graphs gained popularity in 
the early twentieth century as a modem way  to assure that the information 
gathered and analyzed at some cost to the company would be used to aid in 
managing it. William Henry Leffingwell, an early twentieth-century expert in 
office systems and machinery, summarized the prevailing view: “There is . . . 
no  doubt  that  a  graphical chart,  correctly  made,  shows tendencies much 
quicker and impresses the mind more accurately and emphatically than do 
figures” (1927). An earlier systematizer noted that the executive “must have 
reports of his costs, his sales, his profits or his loses, but he must have them 
in such forms that he can interpret them instantly and draw conclusions for 
future guidance. . . . In a modem organization the executive obtains this in- 
formation  through  a  system of  graphic records,  a simplified  summary of 
countless departmental statistics and itemized reports” (Parsons 1909, 2 14- 
15). Because they were not able to get through all of  the reports and docu- 
ments sent to them, around 1920 Du Pont’s Executive Committee went so far 
as to have a comprehensive set of  graphs developed around the firm’s return 
on investment formula, and to have a room specially equipped to display them 
to the committee for decision making (Yates 1985). 
Disseminating the increasing number of notices, bulletins, and other state- 
ments of policies and procedures flowing down the hierarchy required another 
type of  information technology: some method of  duplicating documents in 
numbers ranging from half a dozen (e.g., for notices to department heads) to 
hundreds or even thousands (e.g., to all employees). Press copying made one 
or at most two (relatively dim) copies. Initially, there were only two altema- 
tives for creating multiple copies: writing or typing a notice repeatedly, or 
having it printed. Both were costly and time-consuming processes. While rail- 
roads, with wide hierarchies and critical safety issues, depended heavily on 
expensive printing for such downward flows of  information, manufacturing 
firms were reluctant to incur that expense. In the late nineteenth century, rapid 
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copies became available and were rapidly adopted by firms to aid in dissemi- 
nating information to employees (Yates 1982). 
Carbon paper and the typewriter provided a solution for small numbers of 
copies. In addition to providing the loose copies demanded by vertical filing, 
carbon paper used with fine onionskin paper by a strong typist could make up 
to ten copies at one typing. Thus in the 1880s, as firms adopted the typewriter, 
carbon paper became a way for them to create small numbers of copies. This 
method was convenient, rapid,  and inexpensive for downward communica- 
tions at the upper, narrow part of the hierarchy, or in small units. It could also 
be used to reach a larger population by having each department head or fore- 
man circulate a single copy around a group. When used this way, however, the 
individual employees did not keep a copy, thus making later reference more 
difficult. A method was still needed for creating larger numbers of copies. 
Two such copying methods emerged in the last quarter of the century. The 
hectograph and related methods used  a gelatin bed to transfer an original, 
which was  typed or written  in  aniline dye, onto up to one hundred copies 
(Proudfoot 1972, 34-36).  This process was the predecessor of the more con- 
venient spirit duplicating method that was introduced in the 1920s and was 
still common as late as the 1970s. Duplicating methods based on the stencil 
principle passed ink through holes in a stencil master to make hundreds and 
even thousands of copies from a single master. Thomas Edison first introduced 
the stencil technology to America, initially with his electric pen and later with 
the Edison mimeograph marketed by  the A. B. Dick Company (Proudfoot 
1972). Like the typewriter (with which the stencil process was soon coupled), 
stencil duplicating was not originally marketed for use within firms; it was 
advertised as a way to disseminate information outside of firms, as with ad- 
vertising circulars, price lists, and musical sco~es.~  Large firms such as the 
railroads and telegraph companies, however, were quick to see the value of 
this technology to their internal communication, and soon stencil advertise- 
ments listed internal circulars and notices among the items the devices could 
be used to duplicate. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, duplicating technologies were widely 
used for quick and inexpensive dissemination of large numbers of notices or 
other mass distribution items within firms. These devices ensured that those 
at lower levels received their own copies of such notices so they could refer to 
them in the future. Such copies also helped fill the vertical filing systems that 
quickly proliferated throughout firms. 
9.  The target market is revealed in contemporary advertisements, such as an advertising circular 
“Edison’s Electrical Pen  and Duplicating Press,” 1876, in the Edison National Historic Site in 
Menlo Park, NJ, and in catalogues issued by retail businesses carrying such equipment, such as 
“Catalogue of Telegraph Instruments and Supplies,” Western Electric Company, 1883, Trade Cat- 
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4.2.6  Information Technology and Information Supply 
The information devices and techniques used by  mid-nineteenth-century 
businesses to handle information would have been hard pressed to handle the 
volume of internal information that firms used by the early twentieth century. 
In response to the growing demand for internal information, mechanical and 
clerical technologies emerged and were widely adopted to aid in every phase 
of information handling, from collecting and compiling it to disseminating it. 
To  some extent, the mechanical and bureaucratic technologies of information 
came to be seen as external symbols of modem, systematic management, giv- 
ing the supply side, as well as the demand side, an additional ideological 
component. 
In some cases, the techniques or devices already existed in some form, but 
were only widely adopted when the need emerged. Carbon paper and graphic 
presentation of  data, for example, fall in this category. In other cases, tech- 
nologies were created or significantly developed in direct response to the mar- 
ket demand created by business information needs. In the 1920s Leffingwell 
argued that what he terms the “office appliance industry” of  mechanical de- 
vices such as the typewriter, adding machine,  duplicator, and tabulator re- 
sulted from the new demand for uniform, systematic methods of management: 
When business method was individual and self-centered and business aims 
narrow and secretive, there was little incentive for inventive genius to bum 
the midnight oil in the search for business machinery. The demand for me- 
chanical office appliances did not exist because there was no similarity of 
method. But as similarity of method spread through the exchange of ideas, 
the possibilities for mass production attracted some of the keenest minds in 
the country, who turned to making machines and devices that would sim- 
plify the mass of problems crowded into the business man’s day. As a result, 
an immense industry has been created-an  industry which produces office 
machines and devices for the entire world. (1926, 18) 
Thus demand factors were significant in spurring increases in the supply (and 
decreases in the cost) of information technologies, which in turn increased the 
affordable supply of information within the firms. These reinforcing tenden- 
cies were further enhanced as the technologies themselves came to be seen as 
evidence of modem management techniques, and thus were adopted for ideo- 
logical as well as efficiency reasons. 
By increasing the supply of affordable information, these information tech- 
nologies played an important enabling role in the development of large firms, 
especially vertically integrated ones that needed to coordinate multiple func- 
tions. I would argue that without these techniques and devices, the supply of 
information available to firms at reasonable prices would not have kept pace 
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systematized their management.  lo Thus growth and vertical integration might 
have been  limited,  or  new  managerial methods for  internal coordination, 
methods less dependent on vertical,  paper-based  information flows, might 
have been developed. 
4.3  Scovill: A Case Study of the Evolution of an Information System 
In any given firm, the internal information system evolved unevenly, the 
product of  continual interplay between supply and demand factors. Changes 
in information technology often involved significant investment in money and 
time, as well as shifts in  power within the firm. While some changes were 
incremental, others involved real discontinuities in procedures and capabili- 
ties.  This  section demonstrates that  process in  the  Scovill Manufacturing 
Company.I1 
The case discussion is organized primarily as a narrative, to preserve the 
complexities and interactions over time. I will periodically step back into a 
more analytic mode, but the narrative structure is essential to the point. The 
theoretical and analytic approaches characteristic of  economics generally as- 
sume the actors’ motives and often see a sequence of events as a single event. 
The narrative structure used below tries to capture the unfolding of events in 
time and to understand the actual motives of actors whenever possible. It ex- 
amines the complex interactions between supply and demand, including the 
influences of factors such as ideology and power, in a single company’s use of 
internal information. While the specifics of this case are not generalizable, it 
provides a view of the types of factors and dynamics that may be present in 
many firms and that economists must understand to make sense of firms’ uses 
of internal information. 
4.3.1 
Founded  in Waterbury, Connecticut,  in  1802 as a manufacturer of  brass 
buttons, Scovill was initially a family partnership, and then several interlock- 
ing partnerships, each of  which produced a product line. By 1850, when it 
was incorporated, there were three such partnerships manufacturing buttons, 
hinges, and photographic plates, as well as semifinished brass products. The 
The Early Years: No Systematic Internal Information 
10. The supply side of the information equation may have reinforced the demand differences 
between Japanese and American management methods. The nature of the Japanese written char- 
acters precluded a Japanese typewriter that could produce text faster than it could be produced by 
hand. Thus even if the demand for extensive written communication had been high in Japan, the 
slow speed and high cost of producing records and documents might have prohibited the level of 
use that developed in American firms. 
11. A more detailed discussion of Scovill is in Yates (1989, chap. 6), one of three case studies 
in the book.  The surviving Scovill records that serve as a basis for the story reside in Baker Library 
of the Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration. Scovill has survived and 
thrived in recent years as a diversified Fortune 500 firm. 133  Investing in Information 
newly consolidated and incorporated firm, which had  a work force of  over 
150 people, thus had multiple product lines requiring several different pro- 
cesses. The rolling, casting, and different finishing “rooms” were essentially 
separate departments, run by  skilled workers who reported directly to the 
owners. Nevertheless, at this time and for another two decades, Scovill col- 
lected virtually no internal operating information for use in decision making, 
depending solely on accounts of  external transactions and  oral interactions 
with the skilled workers. 
Scovill  lagged  behind  the  contemporaneous  textile  factories discussed 
above in its use of systematic internal information for coordination. The inter- 
nalization of multiple products and processes left it without pricing informa- 
tion once provided by the market. Nevertheless, the firm as a whole, though 
it faced competition in its various markets, was a successful and growing con- 
cern. 
One fairly unsystematic source of  internal information for Scovill was its 
correspondence  with sales agents and later store employees. Until 1846, when 
Scovill established its own store with salaried employees in New York, sales 
were handled principally by  commission agents (Marburg 1952). Relations 
with the sales agents and initially with the store were relatively unstandar- 
dized, with no systematic flows of  information except for the rendering of 
semiannual accounts of  transactions in traditional form.  Otherwise, corre- 
spondence was ad hoc and situation-specific. 
Minor developments in correspondence between the New  York  store and 
Waterbury headquarters reflect changes in the cost of transmission and dupli- 
cation. In  1845 and  1851, postal rates dropped significantly, lowering Sco- 
vill’s cost for letters to New York from 12.5 cents per sheet to 3 cents for most 
letters (U.S. Bureau of  the Census 1975). The change from hand copying to 
press copying of letters (sometime before  1854) reduced the time and thus 
cost of copying the increased number of  letters into bound volumes. In a 
change that probably reflects both increased business and decreased costs, the 
number of letters exchanged had increased significantly by  the mid-  1850% 
while the length of each letter had decreased. Still, except for the traditional 
semiannual accounts, the flow of information continued to be unsystematic. 
Predictably, a major source of friction evident in the correspondence was a 
tendency for agents to cut prices to meet the competition. As an agent stated 
his case in one such dispute with the owners in Waterbury,  “I am bound to 
comply with your instructions but I do presume you do not wish me to adhere 
to a stipulated price when your competitors are selling for less.”k2  Since letters 
took from a day to a week (depending on weather) to travel from Waterbury to 
12. Taylor to Scovill, 16 March  1829, case 13, Scovill Collection 2, Baker Library, Harvard 
University Graduate School of Business Administration. Hereafter materials from this collection 
will be inserted parenthetically in the text, in this form: Scovill2/13, 16 March 1829. 134  JoAnne Yates 
New  York,  requiring approval from headquarters for any changes in price 
would have lost many sales. This situation continued until after the telegraph 
came to Waterbury in 1849. The telegraph reduced, though it did not entirely 
eliminate, this friction. 
Although the firm gradually came to use the telegraph fairly frequently,13  it 
was used almost exclusively to exchange price and timing information about 
specific, urgent orders. Thus it enabled the firm to improve service to distant 
customers. Because of  the high  cost it was not used for less time-sensitive 
communication, which continued to take place in correspondence. 
4.3.2  The Late Nineteenth Century: Initial Progress in Using 
Internal Information 
The first major change in Scovill’s use of internal information came in the 
1870s at the hands of C. P.  Goss, company secretary, and M. L. Sperry, com- 
pany treasurer. These two men, who were hired as bookkeepers in the 1860s, 
established a managerial dynasty that governed the firm longer than the Sco- 
vill family did. They  instituted “a system of  bookkeeping from which the 
profits of the various sections of the business-mill,  . . . button, burner, alu- 
minum departments, and so on-could  be discovered” (Bishop ca. 19.50,73). 
Various record-keeping forms and a monthly statement were created as part of 
the system.I4 On  the  basis of  these records,  the main  office recorded into 
bound volumes monthly and yearly figures for sales, production, labor, and 
interdepartmental transfers of materials for each department, as well as sales 
by sales office. The information provided by this bookkeeping system did not 
allow costing of the different specific products produced by  each department 
(e.g., the many types of buttons made by  the Button Department), but it at 
least gave Sperry, Goss, and the president a picture of overall results of each 
department. 
Why  was  this primitive cost accounting system introduced at this time, 
rather than at the point of incorporation in  1850 when several functions had 
been combined in a single firm, theoretically creating a need for internal in- 
formation to supplement market signals? The addition of the firm’s first layer 
of general management under the top executive may be significant in the ac- 
tual timing. Before Goss and Sperry rose to secretary and treasurer, the own- 
ers were aided only by  skilled workmen and bookkeepers. The two men rep- 
resented a significant new  layer of  management  that had  to be  vertically 
coordinated. By inventing or, more likely, adapting a cost accounting system 
already used  elsewhere, they improved their ability to serve as the link be- 
13. By 1877, one in ten communications in the press book of outgoing correspondence (Scovill 
1/461) was a telegram. 
14. These forms have not survived to the present, but they survived past 1945, when they were 
noted by  a company  historian  in  a historical list of  forms (which has survived in the Scovill 
Collection in Baker Library), and were used by  Bishop in preparing his manuscript. Only one of 
the bound volumes has survived (Scovill 11242, 1881-87). 135  Investing in Information 
Year  Net Earnings  Assets 
tween the president, on the one hand, and foremen and workers, on the other. 
While Johnson and Kaplan (1987) have identified the internalizing of multiple 
functions in a single firm as the main factor responsible for the rise of  cost 
accounting, Scovill’s history suggests that the introduction of a layer of gen- 
eral management under the owners (a factor also present in the textile mills) 
was  significant as well.  This conclusion is  in  agreement with  Chandler’s 
(1977) emphasis on the growth of  middle management as a key innovation in 
the development of the firm. 
The new system remained the principal source of systematic internal infor- 
mation for the next few decades. It survived from the  1870s, when the firm 
numbered just over three hundred employees and assets were about $1 mil- 
lion, into the early twentieth century, when the firm employed well over a 
thousand and assets were about $3 million (see tables 4.1 and 4.2), virtually 
unchanged (Bishop ca. 1950). 
No corresponding downward flow of recorded information was instituted 
Year  Net Earnings  Assets 
Table 4.1  Growth in Employment at Scovill 
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within Scovill’s plant during this period, in spite of the growth in work force. 
In fact in 1887, when the firm already employed about one thousand, Sperry 
explicitly stated his opposition to written policies: 
We have never had any shop rules printed. There is a general understanding 
that ten hours constitute a day’s work and that the hands are expected to do 
a day’s work if they get a day’s pay. Each department is under the direction 
of a foreman, in whom we trust and who sees that the hands are industrious 
and attend to their business. If they do not do it, he sends them off  and gets 
others. . . . We  do not think printed rules amount to anything unless there 
is  somebody around constantly to enforce them and  if  such a person is 
around printed forms can be dispensed with. (Bishop ca. 1950,205) 
An  internal telephone system was installed early in the 1880s to allow oral 
exchanges between the office and foremen at various mill and shop facilities, 
but the foreman retained informal and direct control over the workers. 
In the last two decades of the century, correspondence with Scovill employ- 
ees outside of Waterbury continued to provide relatively unsystematic infor- 
mation. By  the  1880s Scovill had stores in Boston and Chicago as well as 
New  York.  The firm’s correspondence with all parties, including customers 
and suppliers as well as its own stores, was  increasing rapidly. Early in the 
decade,  Scovill  filled  five  1,000-page  press  books  per  year.  From  1883 
through 1885 this total climbed to six, seven, and then eight volumes per year, 
then leaped to ten volumes in  1886. For the rest of  the decade and into the 
next, the number hovered around nine to ten volumes each year.I5 
In 1888, after the big increase in correspondence, Scovill adopted the type- 
writer (Scovill  1/315,  1888). The timing  suggests that the acquisition was 
motivated by need more than by fad and that it was a response to, rather than 
a cause of, the increase. This time-saving device, along with the hiring of  a 
female typist by  1889 and a second one by  1893 (Bishop ca.  1950, 460), 
relieved the increasing burden of  document production on Goss, Sperry, and 
other office personnel. The new recording technology and division of  labor 
lowered the costs of document production, thus enabling the firm to continue 
expanding its correspondence without incurring excessive costs. The flow of 
information from its stores, however, continued to be unsystematic. 
4.3.3  John Goss and the Systematic Expansion of  Internal Information 
The next major set of changes in Scovill’s acquisition and handling of inter- 
nal information came when the second generation of Goss management intro- 
duced the philosophy and techniques of  the systematic management move- 
ment into the firm to cope with growth. When the company president under 
whom C. P.  Goss amd M. L. Sperry had worked for three decades died in 
1900, they served consecutively as presidents of  the firm. In the years be- 
15. Since most letters were one page long, the shift from handwriting to typing did not radically 
alter the capacity of a single press volume. 137  Investing in Information 
tween the turn of the century and World War I, the firm grew to four thousand 
employees, the managerial hierarchy expanded, and a series of  different de- 
partmental forms were adopted. Early in the period C. P.  Goss’s son, John, 
became first superintendent of the Burner Department and later general super- 
intendent of manufacturing. During that time this proponent of  the period’s 
managerial trends created an extensive internal information system at Scovill. 
In his 1905 “Report Made to the General Manager on Timekeeping in the 
Departments” (Scovill2/34, “Notices, 1905-1907,” 22 February 1905), John 
Goss revealed his sympathy with the systematic management philosophy. He 
noted that potentially costly inconsistencies in payroll timekeeping-one  area 
of data collection-had  emerged across departments over time. The problem 
arose, he asserted, because “the responsibility unchecked rests entirely upon 
the department superintendents and their subordinates to systematize or leave 
unsystematized those details which are vital to the payroll scheme.” He urged 
“those in authority over all the departments to get together with the data and 
decide upon a plan which shall be simple and at the same time applicable to 
all alike.” Thus he wished to take some authority from the department super- 
intendents, including himself, and draw it up to a higher level of management 
by centralizing and standardizing information collection. To prevent any mis- 
understandings or deviations, he recommended establishing a set of  regula- 
tions, to be disseminated downward by  printing them in each payroll book. 
His analysis of the problem and recommendations for solving it suggest that 
his belief in systematic management transcended his own local interests. 
Over the next decade, he and other Scovill executives instituted many sys- 
tems for collecting and analyzing internal information. For example, he stated 
in one document, “It is desirable to get systematized as soon as possible the 
method of receiving goods on our various orders from outside sources of sup- 
ply,  so that we  may be  sure of  getting a reasonable report from the proper 
source of information upon the quality of  each lot of  material that arrives” 
(Scovill 2/34, “Orders and Instructions,” 20 July 1909). Such a process was 
systematized by creating forms or tickets on which information about the ma- 
terial was recorded. This information had immediate value to those using the 
material next. It could also be analyzed later to aid in the choice of suppliers, 
as well as to track the inputs into particular orders and to reduce waste. This 
was one of many such systems put in place. 
In 1907 John Goss developed a new set of monthly cost analysis sheets for 
the Burner Department (Scovill2/333). After demonstrating the usefulness of 
his new methods on a small scale, he extended them to the rest of manufactur- 
ing as he  rose to general superintendent of  manufacturing in  1910. Tabular 
forms were used for recording monthly costs for each room of each depart- 
ment, with the costs categorized into maintenance and repairs, supplies, direct 
and indirect labor, and interdepartmental transfers. Each of  these categories 
was further subdivided to provide greater analytic detail. Monthly summary 
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from these the office prepared yearly analyses, including totals, overhead fig- 
ures, and the ratios of each of the other types of  costs to direct labor costs. 
The yearly summary also included a column for the previous year’s figures, 
for comparison. The yearly summary report for 1907 left blank the column 
for the previous year’s figures, since the old Sperry and Goss system did not 
provide the information necessary to make direct comparisons. 
A brief history of  Scovill’s system of  accounts, written decades later by  a 
company historian, labels this set of changes the “formalization of cost factors 
in a series of analytical records, the results of which could be reported to the 
main office executives and there used in decisions.  . . . This seems to have 
been developed into a well articulated ‘cost office’ in or soon after 1910.”16 
By  1916 this system of cost accounts was so extensive that employees were 
issued bound, printed books, each about one inch thick, describing the system 
and explaining the forms and criteria for charging costs to different accounts. 
This documentation of the system explained its role as follows: “The price at 
which goods are sold is based on their cost; they are not sold at less than cost, 
but at cost plus a profit. Since no  manufacturing business could exist long 
without making profits, it becomes evident that the success of  any business 
depends to a great extent on the accuracy of its cost system. The system of 
accounts is, now-a-days, closely interwoven with the cost system and has be- 
come of equal importance” (Scovill2/236, 1916). 
So important a change had both costs and benefits to the firm. In addition 
to the costs of devising the scheme and creating new forms, there were costs 
for disseminating instructions on how  to use them and costs for monitoring 
their use.  Still, the new  system had  clear benefits, as well.  While the old 
Sperry and Goss system allowed the firm to compute an approximation of the 
overall profits of each room or department, the updated system focused on the 
cost structure of  each unit’s operations and eventually the costs of  specific 
products. As implemented in  1910, it allowed management to monitor the 
relative contributions of different types of costs and to see at a glance the ratio 
of each category and subcategory to direct labor cost. Such amounts and ratios 
could be compared from room to room and over time. It also provided figures 
on the supplies and labor wasted on spoiled work, allowing them to address 
quality issues. As the system was further articulated, it provided more and 
more detail on specific costs. Whether all of this detail was worth its costs or 
whether John Goss and Scovill were at some point simply following the dic- 
tates of systematizers cannot readily be determined. 
The cost accounts and other new data collection and analysis systems being 
introduced by  John Goss and others brought more and  more information to 
executives. At the same time that they were introducing such systems, they 
16. E. H. Davis, “System of  Accounts,” a typed document inserted in a 1916 instruction book 
for the accounting system (Scovill2/236). Internal evidence suggests that the summary was writ- 
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began to adopt graphic techniques of presenting some of  the new data being 
generated. To make cost comparisons between the Burner Department in 1907 
and its successor Manufacturing Department in  1908 easier to comprehend, 
Goss had the data from the sheets graphed for easy comparison (Scovill 21 
328). A few years later, cost data was being graphed as a time series. Clearly 
extra clerical time was  required to  make  such graphs.  The cost was  out- 
weighed for Goss by some combination of the time savings, the improvement 
in understanding for the executives, and the symbolic value of using graphs. 
At  the same time that Goss was  establishing an upward flow of  internal 
information, he also established a downward flow to standardize and docu- 
ment policies, rules, and orders. In the late nineteenth century, C. P.  Goss and 
Sperry had initiated the first upward flow,  but they rejected on principle a 
corresponding downward one. By the early twentieth century, the work force 
was still larger, and additional levels had been added to the hierarchy. Still, a 
change in ideology as much as size probably drove the introduction of written 
downward communication at exactly this time. 
Sometime before 1905, John Goss began issuing to his workers and fore- 
men in the Burner Department a variety of  written announcements, notices, 
and specific orders, generally aimed at systematizing their procedures.”  As 
he rose to the position of general superintendent, he continued to issue them 
to a wider audience, including department heads, and also to diffuse this prac- 
tice throughout the organization. By at least 1908, C. P. Goss was also issuing 
occasional notices, and by the second decade of the century, notices, instruc- 
tions, and manuals were being issued at all levels of the organization (Scovill 
2/34, “Orders and Instructions,” 1905-14).  The idiosyncratic methods of  in- 
dividual  foremen,  superintendents,  and  other  lower  and  middle managers 
were curbed by the increasing systematization of procedures at every level. 
Consistent methods for handling such internal communication had not yet 
been devised; individual notices were produced, disseminated, and stored in 
a variety of ways, Rather than copying them in the press books used for out- 
going correspondence, John Goss had them typed with multiple carbon cop- 
ies. He kept the original and one copy in his own box file.Ig  Another copy (or 
several  copies,  when  he  became  superintendent  of  manufacturing)  was 
rubber-stamped with a list of rooms in the affected department. This copy was 
circulated from foreman to foreman, each one checking off or  initialing the 
appropriate room name. Such a system guaranteed that all foremen saw the 
17. The earliest surviving written order (in Scovill 2/34, “Notices”) is dated 28 January  1905, 
but it is designated Superintendent’s Order no.  137, suggesting that Goss had been issuing such 
orders for many months. 
18. The content of  these notices and their role in systematizing procedures are discussed in 
detail in Yates (1989, 172-76). 
19. The originals and copies in the folder labeled “Notices, 1905-1907” (Scovill 2/34) have 
two holes punched at the top, indicating that they were stored in a Shannon file, a box file with an 
arched wire that held papers in place through the punched holes. The carbon copy in each case is 
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notice, but not that they had ready access to it for future reference.2o  Goss was 
to note later that each foreman had his own way of doing things and wanted to 
change his methods as little as possible (Davis ca. 1968, 13). Thus the system 
was clearly suboptimal because it depended on the foremen’s easily distorted 
memory of the notice instead of the notice itself. Nevertheless, it was not until 
sometime in the second decade of the century that the firm adopted duplicat- 
ing technology. The delay may have been linked to another problem, the lack 
of  a system for local storage of  documents. That problem was soon to be 
addressed comprehensively. 
4.3.4  Investing in Storage and Retrieval: Vertical Filing 
By the second decade of the twentieth century, Scovill’s information stor- 
age and retrieval system was under increasing pressure from internal and ex- 
ternal sources (Yates  1982). New  categories of  documentation were being 
generated within the Waterbury facilities, as part of the upward and downward 
flows of  recorded information John Goss initiated. These had no obvious stor- 
age place in  the system of  press books and letter boxes used for correspon- 
dence. This internally generated information was stored haphazardly and in- 
consistently, if at all. 
Waterbury’s rapidly growing correspondence with the external world, in- 
cluding its own stores, posed additional problems. Shortly after the turn of the 
century, Waterbury established a separate series of press books for its corre- 
spondence with the New York store (Scovill 1/510-58),  presumably to make 
this internal correspondence easier to find, as well as to reduce the volume of 
the main series. In the first decade of the century, this new series filled two to 
three press books a year. By  the second decade, however, this series alone 
exceeded in yearly volume that of Scovill’s entire correspondence in the late 
nineteenth century. In  191  1, headquarters started using the more convenient 
carbon copies and rolling press copies instead of  copying directly into press 
books. For the first three years after the change, however, they bound these 
loose copies into chronological volumes functionally equivalent to the press 
books,  generating twelve and  thirteen volumes a year in  1912 and  1913. 
While neither the main press book  series nor  the letter boxes of  incoming 
correspondence have survived from the early twentieth century, probably be- 
cause of their enormous bulk, they no doubt increased correspondingly. 
The enormous growth of this correspondence had consequences for storage 
and retrieval. Storage space alone clearly posed a problem, but retrieval was 
potentially more problematic. Consulting all of the correspondence with and 
about a single customer or transaction (e.g., to resolve a dispute,  assess a 
request for credit, etc.) required searching many press books and letter boxes. 
20. One foreman, E. G. Main, had each notice retyped in his office and stored the typed copy 
on his own Shannon file. This system gave him access to the notices, but at a high cost in retyping 
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The chronologically organized press books of external correspondence were 
indexed by correspondent but not by subject. Unless the precise dates of the 
desired letters were known, the indexes and then the press copies of  several 
volumes (each covering a month or less) might have to be consulted. In addi- 
tion, the searcher would have to consult the box files of incoming correspon- 
dence and the separate press books and box files for correspondence with the 
New  York  store  about  that  customer.  Clearly,  retrieval  was  more  time- 
consuming in the early twentieth century than it had been in the late nine- 
teenth. 
There is some evidence that by  1913 more significant problems of storage 
and retrieval had begun to appear, though their frequency and severity are hard 
to judge.  A letter from Waterbury to the New  York  store admitted defeat in 
one attempt to retrieve a requested piece of  information: “Replying to yours 
of  the 24th regarding terms to Jos. L. Porter & Co., we  are sorry that our 
record for 1908 is quite as inaccessible as yours seem to be, and, unless you 
consider the matter of enough importance, you will let the matter pass” (Sco- 
vill 1/558, 26 December 1913). Accessibility had become a limiting factor in 
consulting some recorded information. This incident may  have been an iso- 
lated one, or it may represent a recurrent event indicating that Scovill’s corre- 
spondence was exceeding the firm’s ability to handle it with its existing stor- 
age system. 
Even before this incident, Scovill had begun looking into new storage and 
retrieval systems, though it is not clear whether they were driven primarily by 
the inefficiencies and accessibility problems of the current system or by a de- 
sire to adopt the most modem office methods for symbolic reasons. Redesign- 
ing the firm’s entire storage and retrieval system required both purchasing 
equipment and changing procedures, and this investment was considered care- 
fully in advance. In  late 1912, an investigation of filing practices at another 
brass company resulted in a report on “Vertical Letter Filing; as practiced by 
the Bridgeport Brass Co.” (Scovill2/26, 12 December 1912). This report de- 
scribed the organization, principles, equipment, and procedures used at that 
firm in  minute detail,  indicating the importance Scovill itself put on these 
matters as it explored the options for its own use. The report noted, for ex- 
ample,  Bridgeport’s total dependence on carbon,  rather than rolling press, 
copies; its methods for combining all correspondence to, from, and about a 
customer in a single place under that customer’s name; its use of subdivisions 
by  subject headings “where they control the correspondent, as in the case of 
their own agents or stores”; and its method of moving old correspondence, in 
vertical file transfer cases, into a fireproof vault every six months. 
Establishing a similar system at Scovill required a considerable investment. 
Scovill had to obtain new equipment, including such items as file cases, fold- 
ers, dividers, and tabs. In addition, it had to abandon its previous investment 
in letter presses and rolling press copiers, as well as any inventory of  letter 
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abandon the human investment in the old, familiar procedures and invest in 
new procedures, including overcoming any resistance to them. One year after 
the Bridgeport Brass report,  and only one week after the letter confessing 
inability to locate a desired piece of  information, Scovill announced the new 
system. 
Headquarters timed the introduction of the new system to take effect at the 
beginning of  1914, stating in its correspondence with the New  York  store, 
“On January 1st we shall start a new system of filing our letters and we shall 
use the vertical system of filing” (Scovill 1/558, 27 December 1913). It gave 
the New York store careful directions about its letters to Waterbury, requiring 
that they limit each letter to one subject, usually a particular customer, and 
that they provide that customer’s name at the top of  the sheet as a subject 
indicator to aid in filing it. The change increased standardization at the ex- 
pense of store autonomy, and thus encountered some resistance. A follow-up 
letter a few days later noted the store’s failure to follow the new rules in some 
letters and stated, “We are changing our system of filing, and we must INSIST 
that you pay particular attention to this matter” (Scovill 1/558, 31 December 
1913). This reminder seems to have elicited better compliance. 
The firm was thus committed to making the new files an effective storage 
and retrieval system allowing them ready access to stored information. After 
the initial investment, the system clearly increased the supply of  accessible 
internal correspondence by  reducing the cost of  searching for it. Moreover, 
the carefully planned centralized correspondence file was soon supplemented 
by unplanned decentralized files in the offices of managers down to the level 
of foremen.*’  These local repositories of information soon included copies of 
downward notices (the adoption of  stencil duplicating technology in the sec- 
ond decade of the century now allowed each foreman to keep a copy of each 
notice) and of upward reports of the sort introduced by John Goss. 
Repositories of  readily retrievable  information were now  available at all 
levels of management. A foreman or superintendent could consult downward 
directives (or be referred to them by  a higher-level manager) to determine 
standard operating procedures. The general superintendent and other supenn- 
tendents and managers could consult cost summaries and other types of  re- 
ports to analyze performance over time and to compare performance among 
units. The new filing system provided an accessible organizational memory 
that reduced the incremental cost of future reference to information. 
The unplanned proliferation of  decentralized files also seems to have stim- 
ulated increased documentation of lateral exchanges (Yates 1982; 1989, 184- 
86). While many upward and downward communications have survived from 
before the advent of  the vertical filing system, there is no surviving lateral 
21. A set of files for two foremen and for E. H. Davis, the statistician, have survived from this 
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correspondence within the Waterbury facilities from that period. The surviv- 
ing post-1914 set of  files from a single foreman, however, is dominated by 
lateral messages. The new  filing system was responsible for the survival of 
these documents, and probably for their numbers, as well. 
Many of these lateral memos were clearly written for documentation more 
than for conveying new  information-they  were intended to create a record 
that each party could keep on file. Many started out “confirming our discus- 
sion” or “confirming our telephone conversations.” A series of communica- 
tions between the foreman of the Casting Shop and someone of  comparable 
level in the Research Department, for example, documents the high level of 
tension between the two departments about power and authority issues. One 
message from the foreman of the Casting Shop begins by quoting a previous 
message from the Research Department about suspending certain weekly re- 
ports and analyses. It continues as follows: 
I would like to go down on record as saying that if  at any time I wish to 
have any part of the program, which has been agreed upon by the Research 
Committee and myself, suspended I will notify the Research Committee. 
This to my mind is a serious subject and unless you feel that it is impossible 
for you to give us the required information, in so far as analyses are con- 
cerned, I will expect that the program agreed upon by the Research Com- 
mittee and myself, be adopted and not the program outlined in your letters 
of above dates. (Scovill2/26, 25 March 1918) 
Managers had very little incentive to document lateral exchanges of position 
if  they were not available to both parties for future reference. Before vertical 
files, there was no consistent way to store them to guarantee their availability 
in the future. After the proliferation of files throughout the organization, each 
party could keep copies in a local set of files, and thus had more incentive to 
create them. 
4.3.5 E. H. Davis and the Postwar Rationalization of 
the Information System 
With the new filing system, all the essential elements of Scovill’s informa- 
tion system were in place. In the next few years, the firm grew rapidly in 
response to the demands and opportunities of World War I (see table 4.3 for 
some financial measures of the firm’s growth during this period). The infor- 
mation system grew increasingly vast and complex. By  1919, over two hun: 
dred different routine reports (each of  them issued at intervals ranging from 
weekly to yearly) drew information in a variety of forms into the general su- 
perintendent’s office.  Because the various reports had  emerged at different 
times over the preceding fifteen-year period and responded to a variety of 
needs, some of  which  had  changed over time, the reporting system itself 
needed to be systematized. In ,1918 the Research Department, which had been 144  JoAnne Yates 
Table 4.3  Growth at Scovill in the Early 'hentieth  Century 
Year  Net Earnings  Dividends  Assets 
~  ~  ~~~~~~  ~ 
1900  $  242,649  $  200,378  $  3,081,492 
1901  200,000  199,088  3,368,376 
1902  492,999  199,168  3,368,376 
I903  331,123  211,430  4,621,494 
1904  413,700  255,116  4,718,145 
1905  392,647  324,210  5,159,167 
1906  595,575  290,162  6,266,330 
1907  767,286  323,064  6,366,026 
1908  469,229  324,106  6,324,836 
1909  497,864  324,112  6,772,851 
1910  517,082  324,112  7,257,228 
191  1  501,344  324,112  8,128,503 
1912  709,854  377,694  8,213,958 
1913  402,624  400,000  8,086,59  1 
1914  456,995  400,000  8,351,659 
1915  5,974,362  900,000  17,520,561 
1916  13,403,462  5,550,000  28,001,237 
1917  9,204,884  6,500,000  33,528,791 
1918  2,130,903  2,425,000  27,970,944 
1919  2,156,025  1,ooO,000  30,260,896 
1920  983,967  1  ,OOo,~  30,722,660 
1921  937,764  1,507,782  28,702,416 
1922  989,408  1 ,OOo,000  28,77 1,904 
1923  3,167,761  2,062,500  35,020,027 
Sources: Figures from 1900 to 1910, plus assets for 191  1 and 1912, come from case 254, Scovlll 
Collection 2, Baker Library, Harvard University Graduate School of  Business Administration. 
Subsequent figures come from Moody's (1916, 1919, 1924, 1931). 
created shortly before the war, hired E. H. Davis to establish a Statistics Of- 
fice. In doing so, Scovill was investing further resources in its internal infor- 
mation system. 
In his attempt to improve statistical analysis of  data for decision making, 
Davis was forced to begin by exploring and assessing the entire upward flow 
of  information in the firm. In an  initial report mapping out the task before 
him, Davis described the development of the existing information system: 
In this plant as in  all plants, notation is made locally covering productive 
progress. In the beginning certain basic records-such  as memoranda, job 
tickets, etc.-were  essential for  the consistent performance of  the work 
itself.  From  this,  gradually,  more  permanent records were  organized- 
either as files in which the working records were preserved or in the form 
of  summarized rescripts [i.e., reports] from them-and  thus a sort of  nu- 
merical history was developed as a background in the more important pro- 
duction offices. Subsequently they became the basis for comparative esti- 
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His preliminary tasks, as he stated them in this report, did not involve analyz- 
ing the statistics but rather improving the quality and consistency of the data 
to be analyzed by addressing shortcomings in the information-gathering sys- 
tem. His initial goals were as follows: 
X.  A general survey of  the existing statistical or record  situation in the 
plant as a whole through a study of printed forms now in use. 
Y.  Repair work in department record systems, by  filling gaps, remedying 
present deficiencies and inaccuracies, etc. 
Z.  Standardization of department records. 
W.  Anticipating and providing for changes of record necessitated by future 
changes in the work of production departments. 
Davis intended to achieve these goals gradually, first gathering and investi- 
gating all data collection forms and making his office “a clearing house of 
reference as to what current records actually exist, and where they are avail- 
able.” He would then make inquiries into the appropriateness of  records of 
various departments. “Eventually,” he continued, “this office may become the 
regular depository of carbon copies of many such reports or records, as they 
are made; and thus a general body of  statistical data covering the entire plant 
will be accumulated, by a sort of evolution rather than by radical change effec- 
tive by  executive order.” John Goss, as a rising member of a managerial dy- 
nasty, had initially recommended and later instituted increasing numbers of 
executive orders effecting radical changes in the information system in the 
early years of the century, overcoming opposition when necessary. Davis was 
a newcomer with neither familial ties nor line position to give him authority. 
Moreover, by  the time of his arrival, substantial material and human invest- 
ment had already been made in the elements of the current system. What was 
possible and necessary, he decided, was an incremental approach to rational- 
izing it. 
His first steps in this process, described in a follow-up progress report three 
months later, involved gathering records and reports from throughout the firm 
(Scovill 2/34, 8 November 1918). He saw the data as falling into six areas: 
“Production Statistics,” “Process Statistics,” “Inventory of  Stores Statistics,’’ 
“Industrial or Employment Statistics,” “Financial or Monetary Statistics,” and 
“General and Economic Statistics.’’  Cost accounting was (and continued to be) 
handled by  a separate organization, the Cost Office (Scovill 2/34,  16 May 
19  19). The records and reports Davis gathered revealed many inconsistencies, 
but in accordance with his incremental plan he did not attempt an immediate 
revision of  the reporting system. Instead, in  some cases he established an 
“intermediate step”: “The receipt of  original reports is now,  in many cases, 
followed by  a consistent tabulation of the information, and then by charting 
the results.” 
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following passage from a memo concerning production reports for the Wire 
Mill, Davis revealed both the inconsistencies in reported information in the 
firm and the difficulties and costs of dealing with them: 
Comparing these reports with the production reports now  being made by 
the Statistics Office for the Rolling Mill and for screws and rivets, I note 
the following differences in arrangement: 
1st. The Wire Mill report, being weekly, does not permit of exact sum- 
mary for even months. The report does not give the items per day, so that a 
reference to the Office books will be necessary to determine a 31-day month 
total. This was done, I recall, several months ago when a special production 
report was called for by Mr. John Goss. 
2nd. The items are given in total, without analysis into orders and ship- 
ments for manufacturing departments and orders and shipments for outside 
customers. 
3rd. No record is kept and no figures are given respecting undership- 
ments or overshipment on orders. Mr.  Roper’s opinion is that there is an 
average overshipment not in excess of lo%, but probably in excess of 5%. 
Should it be desired to present a monthly production report from this Mill 
on the same basis as the others I have mentioned, it would be necessary 
either to make a periodical survey of the books in Mr. Roper’s Office or else 
to establish a duplicate set of bookkeeping similar to that which the Statis- 
tics Office is now doing for the Rolling Mill and, in a lesser measure, for 
screws and rivets. Unless this should be  desired by  the officers who now 
receive Mr. Roper’s report, I should advise leaving the matter alone, for the 
time being at least. The present work of the sort which we are doing occu- 
pies the whole time of one clerk, or about one-fifth of our present clerical 
force. 
The general question of production reports, their form, content and ana- 
lytical detail, is one which I think may properly be raised for consideration 
at some appropriate time. The question might be raised in regard to each 
one of the departments, with the possible exception of the Manufacturing 
Department. For this, the question will have to do more with certain types 
of product than with the entire output of the department. Such a conference 
would, I suppose, be properly one of  the various officers to whom such 
reports are of  interest. My  connection with  the matter would only arise 
later, after it had been decided just what should be done. 
The uniformity and comparability of reports of this sort are as important 
as their completeness and almost as important as their accuracy. (Scovill2/ 
34, 16 May 1919) 
While Davis explained that certain types of  analysis were made difficult or 
impossible by the inconsistencies between these production reports and those 
of two other segments of the firm, he also stated that the clerical cost of having 
the Statistics Office compile such a report on the basis of existing information 
was, at this point, prohibitive. The obvious solution was to revise the whole 
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parable. While Davis saw such a radical revision of the reporting system as an 
issue “which I think may properly be raised for consideration at some appro- 
priate time,” he recognized that any such change would challenge the power 
of  the Wire Mill management to determine what information was collected. 
That decision, he stated, must be made by the “various officers to whom such 
reports are of interest.” Changing the system required considerable investment 
in power to overcome vested interests. Thus he was forced to move slowly, 
taking on only as much as he could handle at any given time. 
To  help him in the statistical work his office undertook, Davis turned to 
devices that would, after an initial investment, reduce the costs of analysis. 
Scovill’s Cost Office already had  a Hollerith machine for tabulating large 
amounts of data (Scovill 2/34, 12 November 1918). Nevertheless, Davis im- 
mediately requested a Powers tabulator and files to hold the punched cards, 
justifying his need as follows: “The Powers Machine will open up a large field 
of statistical investigation and presentation. A certain amount of preliminary 
experimentation is necessary in handling data susceptible of treatment in any 
one of several ways. This machine will make possible a series of provisional 
experiments now prohibitive on account of  the time and labor required, and 
will facilitate actual operation along the lines eventually adopted” (Scovill 2/ 
34, 8 November 1918). The symbolic appeal of such a modern piece of ma- 
chinery was probably significant and may have contributed to the early timing 
of this request. The need for more analytic capacity, however, seems to have 
been real. One example illustrates why extensive manipulation of data with- 
out the aid of  a tabulator such as the Powers machine was  prohibitive: the 
hospital accident report,  one of  several that Davis took over from the Cost 
Office, had  used  17,000 Hollerith punch cards in  1917 alone. The clerical 
work required to manipulate that much data without a tabulator, even with the 
help of calculating machines for the actual calculations, would have been pro- 
hibitively time-consuming and expensive. Thus he saw the value of investing 
in the most versatile labor-saving machinery to reduce the cost and increase 
the supply of  quantitative analysis in  the future. An  office inventory taken 
three years later reveals that Davis also had a Monroe Comptometer, a Bur- 
roughs Electric (Adding or Calculating) Machine, and a Millionaire Calcula- 
tor (Scovill2/34, 18 August 1921). 
Davis knew that his job was not done when he completed his statistical 
analysis; he also invested in techniques and devices for disseminating data. 
One of his first steps was to standardize the format (including scale, type of 
chart, form of data, etc.) of  graphic reports issued by his office.22  The stan- 
dards both supported the integrity of the data and decreased the cost of  rou- 
22. A note (presumably written by Davis) on the back of his file copy of his first report, noted 
the need to establish these standards. Within two months, he issued a ‘Scale Selection Chart and 
Plotting Guide” establishing standards for the size of paper and the scale to be used on cumulative 
charts, given their expected or actual total accumulation (Scovill2/34, 12 October [  19181). 148  JoAnne Yates 
tinely creating such charts. A publication on “Graphs in the Presentation of 
Business Statistics and Reports” from a series entitled “Modern Business,” 
found in Davis’s files, laid out many of the principles he followed, and may 
have been his inspiration: 
The form of statistical or graphic reports made in any business house should 
be carefully worked out and standardized, so that reports may be compiled 
from month to month as a matter of clerical routine rather than as a matter 
of special investigation. By thus standardizing the reports the data likely to 
be required can be on hand promptly when needed by  the executives and 
can be compiled at small cost, since such compilation is a matter of routine 
and likewise is apt to be more free from error than a special investigation, 
which also requires expert work.23 
Davis used graphs frequently in presenting his analyses in subsequent years, 
for everything from daily graphic analyses of metal mixtures used in casting 
(Scovill2/34, 25 February 1919) to a major study comparing the firm’s statis- 
tics from 1914 and 1920.24  By standardizing graphic methods, he reduced the 
cost of using graphs to making information more accessible to those using it, 
as well as following another popular trend. 
Davis also acquired an electrical device to aid him in presenting his graphs 
and other forms of  information to decision-makers. In outlining his progress 
three months after his original report, he included the category ‘‘Publicity of 
Results,” under which he noted that “a reflecting lantern has been ordered, 
and on its receipt and installation in a suitable room we  shall be ready for 
illustrative conferences” (Scovill2/34, 8 November 191  8). This early equiva- 
lent of  an overhead projector would enable him to present and comment on 
his data to company executives, further increasing the supply of information 
to decision-makers. The fact that he ordered this piece of equipment so early, 
before he had made much progress on standardizing  the content of the various 
routine reports, suggests that in this matter, like that of the analytic machinery, 
he was motivated by  a desire to keep up with modern trends in office equip- 
ment as well as to disseminate information efficiently. 
While Davis’s main goal in all his actions was to increase the flow of mean- 
ingful statistical analysis to executives, his efforts had the side effect of reduc- 
ing the amount of unnecessary information reaching the general superinten- 
dent’s office. In attempting to make his office a “clearing house of reference,” 
Davis first compiled lists of all the reports that were supposed to be sent to the 
general superintendent’s office, then began filing copies of  all these reports in 
his own office. To make sure his “database” was complete, he compared his 
lists with what he received and queried any discrepancies. 
23. “Graphs in  the Presentation of Business Statistics and Reports,’’ Modem Business, report 
no. 84, found in Davis files (Scovill2/34). The report was apparently issued by some subscription 
service. Internal evidence suggests that it came out between 1915 and 1918. 
24. A description of the  1914/20 comparative study, which has not itself survived, remains 
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This process led Davis to uncover a number of reports that had once been 
mandated during John Goss’s push to increase reporting of internal informa- 
tion, but that no longer served a very useful purpose to him. Many of them 
had been silently eliminated already, but never officially removed from the 
books. In one such instance, for example, Goss made the following determi- 
nation about a report: 
With reference to the weekly fire inspection report and the report of indi- 
cator post gate shut-offs made by  Mr.  Barker of  the Plant Protection De- 
partment, I do not think it necessary to send these reports to me in the future 
unless to draw attention to some peculiar or abnormal condition. I shall 
depend upon you to keep the inspections going, but the clerical work of 
making out the reports can be saved. If there are any other similar reports 
which you think can be cut out please give me an expression of your opin- 
ion with reference to the same. (Scovill2/34, 8 March 1920) 
In  general,  Davis’s investigations combined with postwar pressure to cut 
costs as earnings fell (see table 4.3) led Goss to question the value of specific 
reports. His belief  in a basic tenet of  systematic management, the value of 
information  in  measuring  and  improving  internal  efficiency,  had  initially 
driven a vast proliferation of reports to pull information into his office. Now, 
however, he weighed the value of the information more carefully against its 
costs, as he stated in another such instance: “I am giving up certain reports 
that do not seem to me worth while to continue further in view of the labor 
required to compile them” (Scovill 2/24, 25 April  1921). The net impact of 
this reassessment of the internal information system may be approximated by 
looking at Davis’s lists. While the 1919 list of reports to the general superin- 
tendent contained 200 reports, that figure had dropped to about 150 in 1920, 
and to about 50 by  1921 and 1922.While some may still have been compiled 
and used at lower levels, evidence suggests that many were eliminated. 
4.4  Conclusion: Uneven Acquisition and Use of Internal Information 
in Firms 
This paper has explored some aspects of the supply and demand for infor- 
mation within firms during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
when most firms first established extensive internal information systems. The 
case study highlights some important interactions among technical, organiza- 
tional, and financial factors in  acquiring and  using information during that 
period. This historical case also seems to have some suggestive parallels in 
today’s firms. 
4.4.1 
In Scovill and many other manufacturing firms in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, information demand was being driven by  growing 
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firm size and complexity, coupled with the ideology of  systematic manage- 
ment. At the same time, developments in office methods and devices-which 
often became symbolically associated with the systematic management ideol- 
ogy-decreased  the cost of handling information, thus enabling firms to in- 
crease their supply of information at a given cost. Without these technological 
developments, even discounting for their symbolic appeal, the cost of acquir- 
ing the amount of  information desired for the systematic management of  a 
large multifunctional firm would probably have been prohibitive. Such firms 
might not have evolved in the same way  without the supporting changes in 
information technology. Other forms of coordination might have replaced ver- 
tical coordination by  flows of  written information, or firms might have re- 
mained smaller and less functionally complex. 
The  case study of  Scovill shows the ways in which supply and demand 
forces interacted in real firms, and the unevenness of changes in the acquisi- 
tion and use of information. Investments in Scovill’s information system did 
not necessarily take place at the point when we might expect the demand first 
to be felt. For example, cost accounting was not introduced at the point when 
the  multiple  processes  and  products  initially  coordinated  by  the  market 
through separate (though interlocking) partnerships were internalized into a 
single, incorporated firm. Only twenty years later was a cost system intro- 
duced, initiated by a new layer of management. Similarly, the desire to appear 
modem and systematic may in some cases have led to an increase in the sup- 
ply of information before it was needed. For example, E. H. Davis purchased 
devices for the analysis and dissemination of statistical information before he 
had solved the more basic issues concerning what types of information should 
be collected. 
In addition, the information system did not immediately respond to reduced 
or modified demand for certain types of information. E. H. Davis discovered 
many reports that John Goss judged no longer worth the clerical time to com- 
pile, but that were not completely eliminated until Davis drew attention to 
them in  his review  of  the reporting system. He  also discovered that  some 
reports did not provide information in the form that would be most valuable 
to  the  firm’s executives in  monitoring and  comparing its  own  production 
across units.  Since these reports were entrenched among middle managers 
who used them on the departmental or unit level, changing them to another 
form required writing off  the local investment in the existing form, challeng- 
ing the power balance within the managerial hierarchy, and overcoming inevi- 
table resistance. The units did not want to give up familiar procedures to pro- 
vide  better  information  for  the  firm  as  a  whole.  In  addition,  improved 
comparability across units may have been perceived as a threat to those with 
weaker records. Somehow both local and firm-level perspectives needed to be 
taken into account, requiring an evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, ap- 
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By  1920, when my study ends, Davis was just beginning to get the existing 
reports under control. Over time, he must have been just about as successful 
as those in similar firms, since Scovill continued to grow and its rank by asset 
within its SIC code did not vary much from 1917 (seventh with $33.5 million) 
to 1930 (eighth with $48.2 million) to 1948 (sixth with $72.1 million; Chan- 
dler 1990, appendices A.  1, A.2, and A.3). 
4.4.2  Parallels in Today’s Firms 
Today, rapid changes in information technology continue to reduce the cost 
of acquiring, analyzing, and presenting a unit of information, at the same time 
that  increasingly  global  markets,  demands  for  customization,  and  rapid 
changes in  all types of  products and technologies augment the demand for 
information. Changes in the supply of  information are particularly salient, 
with computer and telecommunications technologies evolving at an extremely 
rapid rate. 
While the declines in cost per unit of information processed have been and 
continue to be dramatic, at 30-40  percent per year for components such as 
logic devices and random access memory, the expected improvements in pro- 
ductivity, especially in white-collar occupations, have not always materialized 
(Jonscher 1988; Yates and Benjamin 1991). The preceding historical analysis 
suggests at least two general explanations for these facts, one focusing on the 
stage of the information-handling process facilitated by various technologies, 
and the other focusing on complex interactions between organizational and 
technological change over time. 
Modern information technologies have radically improved the speed and 
reduced the cost of collecting (e.g., computerized capturing of data from man- 
ufacturing processes),  transmitting (e.g., via  computer and phone lines or 
satellite transmission),  storing and retrieving (e.g., standard and relational 
databases),  and  analyzing (e.g .  , mainframes, parallel processing systems, 
personal computers) information. There have also been improvements in the 
physical aspects of dissemination (e.g., rapid electronic dissemination to any 
number of recipients via electronic mail or fax). These stages of information 
handling have also, at least in theory, become more integrated, allowing infor- 
mation to flow from one to the next without pause or reentry of data. Compat- 
ibility problems, however, continue to make the benefits of integration elu- 
sive, and sometimes undercut the benefits of  improvements in the separate 
stages of  information handling. 
Still, these changes have greatly increased the amount of information avail- 
able within firms. As we saw in the historical case, increases in the amount of 
information available to executives brought a mounting burden of information 
overload. Corresponding changes in the nature of the analysis and in the pre- 
sentational aspects of  dissemination are needed to make increasing amounts 
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be gained in part through further advances in computer technology (e.g., ex- 
pert systems and enhanced graphic capabilities linked to standard business 
applications) and in part through more intelligent use of existing ones. 
This first explanation also suggests the need for the second one, which fo- 
cuses on organizational and technical change over time. In modem firms, as 
in Scovill, new technological capabilities are adopted at uneven intervals, not 
continuously and incrementally. Investment decisions interact with issues of 
information needs, ideology, and organizational  power. As each element of an 
organization’s information system is established, it becomes entrenched lo- 
cally by  virtue of the human and nonhuman capital invested in  it. Further 
change may thus be resisted until a crisis point is reached. In periods of rapid 
change, today as in the early twentieth century, new systems may be intro- 
duced on top of or beside each other, with additions made almost haphazardly, 
sometimes for reasons of ideology rather than of efficiency or economy (e.g., 
when a firm buys new technology because one executive believes that com- 
puterization is necessary to keep pace with other firms, but no one has a clear 
vision of what need it will fulfill). Often, entrenched systems remain in place, 
as well. In some cases unanticipated organizational consequences may result 
in barriers to full implementation, or to modifications in the main results or 
capabilities of the system. 
Many firms today are in a situation similar to that faced by Scovill when it 
hired E. H. Davis. They have adopted a patchwork of information technology 
responding to perceived or actual needs, but have not yet stepped back to take 
an integrated look at the system as a whole. Thus some information may be 
collected and processed (however cheaply) that is not worth the cost of exec- 
utive time to consider. Conversely, some valuable information may  not  be 
available because of  inconsistencies in  the information systems of  different 
organizational units. All of these factors could undercut the expected produc- 
tivity gains, at least in the short term. 
Judging by an earlier period of rapid change in information needs and infor- 
mation supply, mismatches between the supply and demand for information 
may develop at any given time because of  the complexity of  organizational 
and technical issues involved. This paper suggests that incorporating the cost 
and scarcity of information into economic models requires understanding the 
process by  which information, especially internal information, is acquired 
and used within firms. Acquiring information involves making large and often 
long-lasting investments in  capital, human and nonhuman. The decisions to 
make these investments are shaped by many organizational and technological 
factors, as are their consequences. The assumption that firms can buy infor- 
mation in increments of any size and that they will do so at the moment when 
its value exceeds its theoretical cost is appealing but may not reflect the un- 
folding dynamics of information acquisition and use within firms. 153  Investing in Information 
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Comment  Bengt R. Holmstrom 
Yates’s paper is an admirable piece of investigation, rich in fascinating details 
about the early developments of  modem information technology. It begins 
with a very informative, general summary of the evolution of this technology 
around the turn of the century and follows it up with a case study of the Scovill 
firm, one of three case studies described in Yates’s excellent book on this same 
topic. My  discussion cannot do justice to the great effort and care that has 
gone into this enterprise.  My limited objective is to comment on potential 
connections between this work and modem organization theory. I share Dan- 
iel Raff’s and Peter Temin’s optimism that there is scope for more interaction 
between business historians and organization theorists. I am particularly con- 
vinced that  historical accounts can and  should have more influence on the 
development of organization theory. Of course, I would hope that the reverse 
exchange is of benefit too, though I must leave this to the better judgment of 
historians, since I do not have a real perspective on their scientific mandate. 
To  test the case, I will offer an alternative, theoretical lens through which one 
could view Yates’s topic. I hope it will go a little distance towards convincing 
doubting historians (and apparently there are many, judging from this morn- 
ing’s heated debate) that there is some export value in organization theory. 
But first a few words about the import value (from my perspective) of busi- 
ness history. 
For some time already, microeconomists have been busy developing a better 
understanding of the economic role of organizations. It is fair to say that we 
have had measurable success. We have identified trade-offs that appear central 
for explaining organizational variety, and we have learned to model them rea- 
sonably well. In fact, the ability to model has developed so fast that the bottle- 
neck no longer is in the methods of theory, but rather in our limited knowledge 
of the complexion of  organizations. It is an  understatement to say that we are 
behind in testing our theories. The truth is that we are in desperate need of 
facts. Without empirical guidance, we  no longer know in what direction we 
should proceed. 
Business history can obviously help quench some of  our thirst for facts. 
Empirical work on organizations is unlikely any time soon to become a SO- 
phisticated econometric exercise. By its very nature, facts about organizations 
are not easily captured in simple numerical tables to which regressions can be 
applied in any meaningful sense. The initial kind of empirical work I am en- 
visioning, therefore, is very much in the spirit of the historical accounts I have 
witnessed at this conference. 
Indeed, most of the information about organizations that we presently draw 
on is anecdotal. It is collected from the popular press, from trade journals, 
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and from case studies. But there are obvious drawbacks in relying on contem- 
porary  evidence.  Besides being  poorly  organized,  such  evidence has  not 
passed the test of time. Observing today’s events does not allow us to separate 
fads from lasting organizational improvements. Take for instance the recent 
wave of leveraged buy-outs. In my view, there is no way of telling yet whether 
these  should  be  considered  successes. They could prove failures,  and  we 
could be over with them in a hurry. To interpret them as optimal organizational 
responses, before more evidence is gathered, or to proclaim an eclipse of the 
corporation, as some have done, is certainly premature. 
I am afraid that we often make the mistake of placing too much weight on 
recent developments. We  behave like the market analysts, who find reason in 
every turn of events. And reason is easy to find, given the arsenal of explana- 
tions that modem theories possess. To maintain discipline, a more systematic 
approach is called for. This is where historical studies can play a major role. 
History, with its long-term perspective, naturally filters out aberrations, leav- 
ing in clearer view the organizational characteristics that account for survival. 
Also, by scanning a larger landscape in one sweep, a historical study circum- 
vents some of  the selection biases present in monitoring everyday develop- 
ments.  The temptation to focus on organizational features that match one’s 
own theories, while overlooking the ones that do not, may be the most serious 
empirical problem for organization theory. Under the historical lens, tailored 
theories cannot escape scrutiny as easily. 
Historical studies have a second advantage over contemporary studies. A 
look at the formative years of business enterprise is a look at simpler organi- 
zational forms, operating in simpler environments. I think the recent accounts 
of medieval trading arrangements are illustrative. They seem to point unam- 
biguously to the presence of incentive problems. Apparently, fear of misman- 
agement and fraud shaped ancient agency relationships. By contrast, attempts 
to understand modem executive and management contracts are hampered by 
complications such as tax effects. By the same logic, studies of primitive so- 
cieties, some of them contemporary, have provided clearer evidence that risk- 
sharing and incentive problems impact the design of cooperative organization, 
because the setting is much purer than today’s complex economy. 
Finally, I should stress the importance of having history remind us that or- 
ganizations evolve all the time. Modem organization theory is largely prem- 
ised on the notion that the institutions we observe are driven by the demands 
for transaction efficiency. Of  course, optimizing models can in principle take 
dynamics into account, but in practice they rarely do. Static models that at- 
tempt to explain firm boundaries or their internal structure overlook the con- 
stant change in their shape and scope. A theory of the life cycle of a typical 
firm remains to be developed. The need for such a theory is well underscored 
by tales such as Yates’s description of Scovill. 
Let me now turn to Yates’s paper. The paper has two major themes. One is 
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linked. The other is to point out that the interaction between the two does not 
take place as smoothly as theory would lead one to believe. Rather it is dis- 
continuous and often triggered by crises or by  coincident changes in the ex- 
ecutive office.  For  this  reason,  Yates  notes,  new  methods  at  Scovill are 
adopted sometimes later, sometimes earlier than implied by marginal caicu- 
lus. That seems quite believable, though the paper does not really present any 
hard evidence. In fact, there is surprisingly little reference to financial data. 
Linking performance figures to the changes that took place would have been 
quite desirable. 
The emphasis on idiosyncratic details (or seemingly so) is in keeping with 
the traditions of historical analysis. To  some extent at least, historians are out 
to unearth and preserve the “raw data.” This has much to commend itself. 
Sifting through the details can provide ideas for new theories. Also, for stu- 
dents of management, for instance, the organizational and technological dy- 
namics described in the paper hold important lessons about the role power, 
personalities, and past policies play in the day-to-day affairs of running a busi- 
ness. 
Yet  I am less convinced that many of the details are important in trying to 
identify what  accounts for the ultimate success of  organizations. I am re- 
minded of a case I taught recently, which recollects the Japanese entry into the 
U.S.  motorcycle market. From a distance, the case reads like a textbook in- 
stance of a producer exploiting economies of scale in a large home market to 
enter profitably a smaller market dominated by  less efficient firms. In a few 
bold moves, the small firms are all but driven out. Yet  when one reads the 
detailed history of  the case, a very different story emerges. It turns out that 
the Japanese did not have much of a strategy at all, and what there was of it 
was completely flawed. Only by accident, it seems, did they hit on a winning 
combination.  But  what  difference does this  make? The fact remains that, 
whether  chosen  by  serendipity  or  by  conscious  calculation,  the  strategy 
proved successful. And the reason it did so had a lot more to do with the 
economic logic of the situation than with its idiosyncratic path. I submit that 
the moral of this story may often carry over to the historical study of organi- 
zational change. 
Yates’s  other theme,  that  innovations in  information technology interact 
closely, if not in lockstep, with organizational developments, is of particular 
interest to modern organization theory, as this theory almost exclusively de- 
rives its predictions from the assumption that information is costly to com- 
municate and process. In a general way,  Yates’s  account confirms this basic 
premise. She points to evidence that coordination needs created a demand for 
centralized information processing, and she also indicates that there were con- 
cerns about misappropriation of financial assets and hence a need to control 
operations more tightly. But perhaps the data would have allowed more signif- 
icant contact with recent theory. Let me illustrate it with one example. 
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Roberts on modern manufacturing.’  They develop a model that attempts to 
explain the recent move away from mass production to flexible production. 
The roots of the  theory  can be traced to Jay Galbraith, a sociologist,  who 
articulated  the view that firm organization  is largely  conditioned  by  uncer- 
tainty.* Firms respond to uncertainty either by reducing it or by adapting to it. 
Uncertainty can be reduced by controlling the environment (as the American 
automobile industry is claimed to have done) or via improved internal com- 
munication (as in Scovill’s case). Adaptation can be accomplished by main- 
taining more slack (e.g., by raising inventory levels) or by decentralizing au- 
thority (which Scovill also tried). 
The notable aspect of  Galbraith’s theory is that it makes significant refer- 
ence to market structure and technology. It makes clear that one cannot look 
at information systems and organizational design in isolation. This is so, not 
only because production and demand functions condition what can be done 
internally, but because the list of  instruments for coping with uncertainty in- 
clude technological and product choices as well. According to this theory, we 
should be asking questions such as, How well could Scovill control the de- 
mand side? What did its production technology look like? What technological 
options did it have? Can one detect any systematic changes in inventory man- 
agement in conjunction with shifts in information systems? Did the firm make 
to order at any point? Yates does refer to production technology and market 
conditions,  but rarely  and rather disconnectedly  from the  rest  of  her story. 
They should be given more serious attention, because they exhibit important 
complementarities with organizational variables. 
The significance of complementarities  is well developed in Milgrom’s and 
Robert’s  work. They note  that complementarities  induce convexities  in the 
objective function of firms: marginal adjustment in a single instrument (e.g., 
information acquisition) is often suboptimal, because other instruments (e.g., 
incentives and control variables) complement it. When changes eventually oc- 
cur, they tend to be discrete and involve the full range of instruments, organi- 
zational as well as technological.  The shift from mass production to flexible 
production illustrates this principle. That it was triggered by reductions in the 
cost of  data processing and flexible technology seems accepted. The key in- 
sight is that these factors reinforce each other in a way that causes the shift to 
take place in one big move, rather than insidiously (in any given firm). 
Put differently, Milgrom’s and Robert’s theory tells us that organizational, 
informational,  and technological attributes of the firm tend to appear in clus- 
ters. Flexible manufacturing technology,  low levels of inventory, low invest- 
ment in demand information, multiskilled labor, all go together because they 
complement each other. By the same logic, a firm with mass-production tech- 
1. Paul  Milgrom and John Roberts, “The Economics of Modem Manufacturing: Technology, 
2. Jay Galbraith, Designing  Complex Organizations (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publish- 
Strategy, and Organization,”  American Economic Review 80( 1990):5  1 1-28. 
ing Company, 1973). 159  Investing in Information 
nology is  likely to choose the opposite attributes. What we do not  see is a 
random mix of these attributes. This is a significant prediction. 
One of  the virtues of  focusing on comovements in  firm attributes is that 
such a theory is not rendered useless when there are multiple equilibria. By 
this I mean that the theory is not predictively empty as soon as it must admit 
that there can be several possible outcomes. To  take an example, much has 
been  made of the differences between Japanese firms and U.S. firms. Many 
have asked, How can this be consistent with a single theory of optimization? 
And most have concluded that culture must play a significant part. That may 
well be the case. An alternative interpretation is that we are witnessing two 
different equilibria of the same system (indeed, at some level this is almost a 
tautological statement). But whichever interpretation one gives to the history 
of events, it need not change the conclusion that firm attributes should cluster 
in particular ways. If Milgrom and Roberts are correct, the flexible manufac- 
turing firms in the United States should soon exhibit patterns of operation and 
organization significantly similar to their Japanese counterparts. 
Studying the firm as a cluster of  attributes is reminiscent of modern busi- 
ness cycle theory, which concedes that it cannot predict business cycles but 
still is capable of explaining comovements within the cycle. 
This leads me to end on an optimistic note. Historians like to stress idiosyn- 
crasies and path dependence. We  are where we are, in part because of histori- 
cal accident. What I have said above implies that path dependence and other 
noneconomic factors need not conflict with organization theory nor make its 
optimizing premise irrelevant. Even if  economic theory cannot single out the 
path of  development, it can say a lot about comovements along the path. 
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